Previously I've discussed the unprecedented situation of across the board low interest rates and high valuations across a variety of financial markets. While equity positions were discussed previously, below I'll look at the interest rates across different types of debt markets.
Treasuries - Rates on US Treasuries have fallen significantly. Current yields stretch between zero (short-term) and <3% (for the 30 year). These are the lowest rates across all maturities in recent history. Acting as the gold standard of collateral, demand for US Treasuries has never been higher.

Retail banking rates - Accurate data on many retail banking rates across the market are surprisingly difficult, but certificate of deposit (CD) rates have fallen to near zero, checking account rates have fallen to zero, and savings account rates are averaging around 0.10%. Commercial banks are simply not vying to expand their deposit base. Even with near zero rates, once costs to attend the customer are taken into account the costs to borrow from many day-to-day customers is too high compared to other options.
Credit card rates - There's been a general fall in rates but those who actually carry a balance have seen a slight increase in rates lately. This is an interesting pheneomenon. One potential explanation is an improvement in customer segmentation within credit card companies. Other explanations include increasing credit card limits in a play to potentially increase profits and increased demand for credit for consumers with lower ratings. Unfortunately, publicly available data is thin and there are not many recent publications to tease out which factors are having the biggest pull.
Corporate high quality bonds - This category has been reduced to ultra thin margins. Expected real returns on two year high quality has flipped negative, and a five year bond has to be locked in before placing the investment outside of expected inflation scenarios.

High yield corporate debt (aka junk bonds) - High yield debt has been bid down and has tightly followed the performance of the general market. You might also notice that the earnings to price percentages and high yield returns have mirrored each other quite well in the last few years. The junk market has behaved essentially like the stock market under a different name.
Auto loans - Standard FRED auto loan data has shown consistently falling rates for auto loans that hovered between 4-5%. Take out defaults and operating costs, and the return falls to 2-4%. The subprime segment holds a similar story. Some have pointed out that the potential for a subprime autoloan bubble is overblown because of the percentages of loans to subprime is not quite as high as the '06-'07 peak, among other reasons. However, when I talk to those who operate within this industry they point to the non-public data sets showing subprime rates that have essentially never been lower and the volume is similar to the '05-'07 peak. Also, they point to the publicly available data showing an 18% increase in household autoloan debt since the previous peak in '07. Accordingly, when there is a sort of crash investors will be hit far harder, as the cushion is extremely slim. Furthermore, as subprime autoloan financial products have become more standardized and accessible to the general market, similar to mortgage backed securities but on a smaller scale, there is more likely to be more leverage behind the positions held by finance companies.
Grey and black market rates - These rates by nature are very difficult to measure. However, what is interesting is that there are some indicators that these rates have NOT fallen in line with the rest of the market. Complex information asymmetry along with barriers to entry (e.g., risks of gaming of regulations, moral reprobation, risks of breaking laws, etc.) set this market apart. Although, again, it is an area that is difficult to measure. I plan on writing more on what we do and don't know on this in the future.
Rates are down across the board. However, thinking of "the interest rate" as a single rate is an oversimplification. The concept of general market access and investment barriers will be expanded on further.
Treasuries - Rates on US Treasuries have fallen significantly. Current yields stretch between zero (short-term) and <3% (for the 30 year). These are the lowest rates across all maturities in recent history. Acting as the gold standard of collateral, demand for US Treasuries has never been higher.
Retail banking rates - Accurate data on many retail banking rates across the market are surprisingly difficult, but certificate of deposit (CD) rates have fallen to near zero, checking account rates have fallen to zero, and savings account rates are averaging around 0.10%. Commercial banks are simply not vying to expand their deposit base. Even with near zero rates, once costs to attend the customer are taken into account the costs to borrow from many day-to-day customers is too high compared to other options.
Credit card rates - There's been a general fall in rates but those who actually carry a balance have seen a slight increase in rates lately. This is an interesting pheneomenon. One potential explanation is an improvement in customer segmentation within credit card companies. Other explanations include increasing credit card limits in a play to potentially increase profits and increased demand for credit for consumers with lower ratings. Unfortunately, publicly available data is thin and there are not many recent publications to tease out which factors are having the biggest pull.
Corporate high quality bonds - This category has been reduced to ultra thin margins. Expected real returns on two year high quality has flipped negative, and a five year bond has to be locked in before placing the investment outside of expected inflation scenarios.
High yield corporate debt (aka junk bonds) - High yield debt has been bid down and has tightly followed the performance of the general market. You might also notice that the earnings to price percentages and high yield returns have mirrored each other quite well in the last few years. The junk market has behaved essentially like the stock market under a different name.
Auto loans - Standard FRED auto loan data has shown consistently falling rates for auto loans that hovered between 4-5%. Take out defaults and operating costs, and the return falls to 2-4%. The subprime segment holds a similar story. Some have pointed out that the potential for a subprime autoloan bubble is overblown because of the percentages of loans to subprime is not quite as high as the '06-'07 peak, among other reasons. However, when I talk to those who operate within this industry they point to the non-public data sets showing subprime rates that have essentially never been lower and the volume is similar to the '05-'07 peak. Also, they point to the publicly available data showing an 18% increase in household autoloan debt since the previous peak in '07. Accordingly, when there is a sort of crash investors will be hit far harder, as the cushion is extremely slim. Furthermore, as subprime autoloan financial products have become more standardized and accessible to the general market, similar to mortgage backed securities but on a smaller scale, there is more likely to be more leverage behind the positions held by finance companies.
Grey and black market rates - These rates by nature are very difficult to measure. However, what is interesting is that there are some indicators that these rates have NOT fallen in line with the rest of the market. Complex information asymmetry along with barriers to entry (e.g., risks of gaming of regulations, moral reprobation, risks of breaking laws, etc.) set this market apart. Although, again, it is an area that is difficult to measure. I plan on writing more on what we do and don't know on this in the future.
Rates are down across the board. However, thinking of "the interest rate" as a single rate is an oversimplification. The concept of general market access and investment barriers will be expanded on further.
